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Case No. 6216 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. J. JEREMY, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
vs. 
ANGEL BERTAGNOLE and LEo M. 
BERTAGNOLE, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
SuMMIT CouNTY, a municipal ·cor-
~ poration, 
Intervener and Respondent, 
and 
· MoRGAN CouNTY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
J I 
Intervener and Resp·ondent. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E. J. JEREMY, 
Plaintiff and App,ellant, 
~ 
vs. 
ANGEL BERTAGNOLE and LEo M. 
BERTAGNOLE, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and· 
SuMMIT CouNTY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
Intervener and Respondent, 
and 
MoRGAN CouNTY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
Intervener and Respondent. 
Case No. 6216 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Comes now E. J. Jeremy, the plaintiff and appellant 
above named, and files this his petition for re-hearing 
in the above entitled matter, and for a re-examination 
of the record, the same to be considered in connection 
with his assignments of error heretofore filed herein 
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2. 
with the points wherein and hereby it, is alleged~ the 
court has erred as follows : 
1. The court has failed to state its "re·asons'' f.or 
its d-ecision. 
2. The court has ignored the Assignments of Error. 
3. The court has failed to give effect to the burden 
of proof. 
HARLEY w. ·GUSTIN' 
Attorney for PLaintiff 
a;nd A ppel~Zarnt. 
CERTIFICATE. 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is the -coun-
sel f.or appellant and that in his opinion there is good 
reason to believe the judgment herein is ·erroneous and 
that the same ought to· be re-examined. 
D~TED this 25th day of September, 1941. 
HARLEY W. GusTIN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
. and Apvpellarnt. 
·BRIEF OF AuTHORITIES RELIED UPON. 
The oour·t has failed to state its ''reasons'' for its 
I 
decision. 
The Constituti~on of the State of Utah, Se·ction 25, 
of Article VIII, makes it mandatory for the court to 
state its reasons for its decision. ·The section is as 
follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'' ''"Yhen a judgment or deeree is reversed, 
modified or affir1ned by the Supre1ne C·ourt, the 
reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writ-
ing, sig-ned by the judges concurring filed in the 
office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and 
preserved \Yith a record of -the case. Any judge 
dissenting therefrom, may give the reasons of his 
dissent in writing ·over his signature.'' (Italics· 
ours). 
We think it must be conceded that the Constitutional 
provision is to be given its ordinary, practical a.nd com-
mon sense meaning and that the statement of the reasons 
means a statement of the circumstances or proof, fact~ 
or motives which generate conviction. McKenna v. 
White, 192 N. E. 84, (Mass.) 
The court has not stated the reasons, a.s so defined, 
for the -conclusion that it arrives at. The opinion does 
not poin_t out where the :(act of the allege~d abandonment, 
dedication or user of the rorad in question is found in the 
record, such as would require the forfeiture or loss of 
the property right involved, except by sp·eculatiori and 
conjecture. With all of the emphasis that we ca~ sug-
gest, and yet with the utmost deference to this learned 
court's opinion, we contend that it is not enough for the 
court to say that it agrees with our statement of funda-
mental rules of law and then to S'ay: 
''W·e are of the opinion that the evi.dence 
supports the findings of the trial court as to user 
of the road, that under the law of this jurisdic-
tion the ·court did not err in decreeing .it to be 
dedicated as a p:ublic way nor in fixing its width 
as by the decree provided. '' 
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4 
We are entitled to know and to have the opinion 
state the ·evidence that the court says is in the re.cord 
that supports the findings of the trial court. The court 
says: 
''Twenty-eight witnesses were called by de-
fendants who testified to the nature of the road 
and to the use thereof which they had observed, 
as well as the use whi.ch they had themselves 
made of the road. With respect to the use there-
of for herding sheep and ·cattle, William Archi-
bald testified that he observed sheep and cattle 
using it in the early seventies. He worked out 
poll tax on the road £orty years ago. Use of the 
road by sheep made worJ:r on the road necessary.'' 
The expression quoted is the closest approach found 
In the opinion to a statement ·of an evidentuary fact. 
Does the court intend to hold that Archibald's obser-
vation of sheep and eattle using the road in the early 
s-eventies justifies a decree that takes private property 
for a public use without ~comp·ensati·on ~ Is it controlling 
to say that Archibald worked out a poll tax forty years 
ago be·cause of debris in the road resulting from the 
traffic of livestock~ The sheep and cattle that Archibald 
,.says that he saw forty years ago might have been anQ. 
probably were the sheep and cattle of the father of 
appellant and the predecessor in interest. Archibald's 
testimony, we believe, is fairly !abstracted at pages 118-
119 of our Abstract of the Reco.rd as foll·ows: 
''I am ~8 years old and reside in Salt Lake 
City. I spent the greatest part of my life in 
Summit County at Snyderville. I was well ac-
quainted with the East C~onyan road until about 
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5 
the last eighteen years. There was a road there 
in 1869 or lrhat you tvould call a trail. If you 
got on a bad place, you lU'ould hold the w·agon 
up on the one side and get off when you c:ould and 
if you didn't tip over and the wagDn w·as on top 
of yo·u, you, were all right. I could determine 
from the road that ·other wagons had gone up 
and down there. I next sa\v the road in 1872. 
Around 187 4, I observed little bands of sheep and 
cattle coming in from Salt Lake County and using 
the road. For many years, I worked for the 
state in the Fish and Game D;epartment and had 
to do with the planting of fish on East Canyon. 
I owned a sawmill at the mouth of Bear Creek. 
The lumher was hauled and marketed a.t Park 
City, and it went out over the East Canyon road. 
There \Yas an old mill at Maxfield's. A man by 
the name of Sousta ran sheep down there from 
property leased frnm George A. Lowe. This was 
in '84 or '86. He used to drive his sheep back 
and forth over what is now the Jeremy property. 
Around 1895 or '96, I was a County Commissioner 
for Summit County. The eounty didn't spend 
much money and there was quite a question be-
tween Summit County and Morgan County as to 
the boundary line. We didn't bother much with 
the road, but Morgan County put in a bridge. I 
remember work being done ·On the road to pay the 
poll tax. This was ·a little over forty years ago. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
We did work on the road to pay the poll tax 
and to also help in getting the lumber out. When 
the road got slip·pery, a goose couldn't stand on 
it if its feet were webbed and the -sheep going 
along there had always filled the upper end. 
When I refer to the Jeremy ranch, I am referring 
to the father of Ethan Jeremy. He and I were 
good friends. I do not know whose sheep I saw 
there tv hen I was in the country." (Italics ours). 
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If the case is to be decided upon the testimony 
~f Archibald and treated as the ''reas-on'' why the court 
affirmed the decree of the trial .court, then it must be said 
that the decision itself is contradictory because the court 
says: 
''True, such testimony does not reveal that 
ap.y witness used the road at weekly, monthly, 
or even yearly intervals over a period of ten 
years; but from the evidence adduced the infer-
ence is ·clearly a reasonable one that the road was 
used for the driving of cattle and sheep for a 
number of years in excess .o:f that required, when-
eve-r it was necessary or convenient for the mem-
bers of the public who were engaged in raising 
or herding stock to so use it.'' (Italics ours). 
As hereinabove indicated, the testimony of Archibald 
does not show user of the road sufficient in time or. in 
law to support the conclusion arrived at. We respect-
fully request the court to point out the or other 
evidence that it says is in the record to substantiate its. 
conclusion. A critical analysis of the decision might 
easily suggest that Archibald's testimony was the strong-
est testimony that the court ·Could find and we submit 
.that its insufficiency is apparent. 
Ap·parently, this court is ·committing itself to a doc-
trine which l.s wholly incompatible with the protection 
of private interests and private property rights. The 
court is permitting property to be taken from Mr. 
Jeremy by merely inferring an adverse user without 
stating what fact or group ·of facts gives rise to the 
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inference. W. e suggest that it is not sufficient under 
the Constitutional p·rovision to say: 
''It \Yonld unduly extend this opinion to set 
out the e'-i.dence in support of the finding of the 
trail court to this effect (the inference). Suffice 
it to say that it \vas sufficient." 
The reason why it was sufficient must be stated; 
otherwise, \Yhat use is a written decision~ And we 
submit that in the decision of the court as it now stands 
there is nothing of value .as a precedent. There is noth-
ing stated by way of any analysis of fact that can he 
used as a criterion for the proposition that a public 
road of the width declared, has been fix·ed hy dedication, 
abandonment or user. We ·.are entitled to know the rea-
sons that prompted the court in affirming the trial court's 
decision and the logic behind the same. 
The court has ignored the Assignm.(3nts of Error. 
The assignments all go to the question ·of the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the judgment and 
decree of the trial court. The situation requires the 
court to analyze the entire record. The court says in 
effect that Archibald's testimony is not sufficient to sup-
port the findings and yet makes no referen-ce to the testi-
mony .of any other witness, except by indirection, if even 
that ean be said. 
In order that a thing can he inferred or presumed 
there must be something to base the inference or p·re-
sumption .upon. The mere fact that twenty-eight wit-
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nesses were called by the defendants and interveners 
does not supply the missing link, nor does the number 
of witnesses ,justify the court in the indulgence of an 
inference. In order that the assignments of .error in 
this case be properly ruled upon, the court must, if nec-
essary, extend the opinion sufficient to set out the evi-
dence that supports the findings. To say that ''it would 
unduly extend this opinion to set out the evidence in 
support .of the finding of the trial court to this effect,'' 
and then to follow with the comment that: "Suffice it to 
say, it was sufficient" is to ignore our assignments of 
error and to result in an opinion that is wholly without 
value to anyone, and in particular to indicate that justice 
has not been meeted out to the parties litigant. The 
decision, as it now stands, means nothing to a person 
familiar with or not familiar with the record. It has 
no value as a precedent. 
The court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdic-
tion, must pass upon the assignments of error, if the 
error is properly assigned. If the assignments of error, 
in form, ·do not raise ·a reviewable issue, the court should 
so state. If they do raise a reviewable issue, then the 
litigants, the bench and the bar in general are entitled 
to know that each assignment has been exhaustively 
reviewed. In this case, the only way that the assign-
ments of error can be ·exhaustively reviewed, and the 
fact indicated, is for the court to p·oint out the evidence 
that supports the findings of the trial court. 
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The court condenses its idea of appellant's conten-
tion as follo"~s: 
'• .... \s hereinabove stated, his (the appellant's) 
-objection to the judgment below, and the findings 
upon which it is based, goes to the use of the 
way by any traffic to a greater width than 16 feet 
and to any use for the purpose of trailing or 
driving sheep or other herds of livestock.'' 
and the court states its premise in the following language: 
'·'It is clear fron1 the evidence tha;t if the find-
ing of the court to the effect that the road had 
been continuously used for more than the requisite· 
period to esta·hlish dedication for the driving and 
trailing of herds of cattle, horses, and especially 
sheep along it, the width of five rods fixed by the 
_court as the width which is reasonably necessary 
for the pu!blic convenience, travel, and use f.or the 
purpose for which the public use (have used) the 
same is not excessive. We .shall hereafter refer 
to the evidence adduced as to the use of the road 
for the purpose of driving stock.'' (Italics ours). 
T·he court agrees that a. bridle path abandoned to the 
public may not be expanded by court decree into a boule-
vard, but the point is that the court did expand, accord-
ing to our contention, a bridle path into a boulevard and 
we say, with all due respects, that. the trial court did it 
without any evidence to justify its action. 
This court specifically refers to the trial -court's 
finding and in part analyzes the same as follows: 
''By its findings of fact the trial eourt found 
that the road in question is, and for more than 
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60 years ha.s been, a well traveled, worked, and 
defined public. road, the center line of which is by. 
the findings particularly described; that said road 
forms a part of the public road system of Summit 
and Morgan Counties and .of that of the !State of 
Utah, connection with State Highway U. S. 305 
on the north and with State Highway U. S. 40-
·5·30 on the south; that it is, and had been for 60 
years, continuously used by ranchmen, stockmen, 
owners of land contiguous and adjacent thereto, 
and by the public generally for all necessary and 
convenient purposes, including p~destrian, eques-
trian, and vehicular traffic, and the driving and 
trailing of horses, cattle and sheep ·and herds of 
·ea·ch along the sa.me ; and 'that by reason of such 
us-e said road has been dedicated and abandoned 
t.o the public· as a public road.' '' 
The quotation next above is a summary of several in-
dividual findings based on the theory respectively of de-
dication, abandonment and user. We say that as an 
expression of the thing pointed out invoking the juris-
diction of tpis court, the evidence is not sufficient to 
support either a dedication, a!bandonment or a user of 
the road in question to the width fixed by the trial court. 
Even a ca.sual inspection of the road will demonstrate 
that the r0;ad has never been· used to the width declared 
and that it is physically impossible to lay out, to con-
struct, -or to maintain such a boulevar·d in that mountain-
ous region. 
The .count has failed to giv.e effect to the burden of 
proof. 
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The defendants and interYeners a.tte1npted to justify 
tneir position, after conceding that Mr. Jeremy was the 
owner of the property, by saying that he had lost a 
property right by dedication, abandonment or user. The 
defendants ·asserted an affirmative right. The trial ·court 
compromised the situation by giving them three rods less 
than the eight rods that they asked for. We say that 
the defendants and the interveners did not evidence their 
contentions by a preponderance of the evidence or by 
any evidence. 
Our original brief goes into the proposition of the 
weight and quantum of evidence required to justify a 
taking of private property for a public purpose without 
compensation. It is consistently held, as a. fundamental 
rule, that property ·Cannot be taken from an individual 
for public use without compensation, unless it is shown, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual has 
lost his right of enjoyment or possession by some ~act or 
negligence of his own. The· importance of an adherence 
to these fundamental rules is recognized by the court 
and there is no difference !between us on the same. 
We do differ, however, ,on the application of those 
rules to the ca·se at bar. The "inference" does not satis-
fy the quantum of proof required. The positive evidence 
in the record of a permissive use, either by way of a 
gratuity or for compensation, destr·oys the probative 
value of any presumption or inference that might other-
wise be indulged in. ·The very nature of this appeal and 
the ·Controversy presented by the record requires the 
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court to point ·out where the evidence justifies the find-
ings and how and in what manner the defendants and 
interveners have sustained the burden of proof. The 
. reeord does not sho\v a dedication, abandonment or a 
use for the required period of time of a five rod road in 
f,avor of the public. 
The court has misapplied the rule announced in the 
eases of Lindsay Lan.d d!i Livestock Co. v. Chu,rnos, 75 
Utah 385, 2S5 Pac. 646, and Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 
341, 44 Pac. 1032. These cases involve a factual situa-
tion that disclose to the reader of the opinion the prop-
riety of the conclusion arrived a.t by this -court. The 
two eases differ in fact but do not differ in the funda-
mental rules of law relied upon. Upon an analysis of the 
two cases, it will be seen that the party litigant assert-
ing the affirm,ative had ample evidence to justify the 
reason based upon facts to germinate this court's de-
cision as announced. In each of the eases mentioned, 
the court did pr.olong its de-cision by stating the facts 
involved, which are wholly different, as a. reading of the 
two decisions, will dis·close. 
The court does not take into consideration the fact 
that the ''public'' does not use Mr. Jeremy's property 
for the trailing of sheep; nor does it take in to considera-
tion that the public .at large is not concerned with the 
trailing of .sheep. H-ere the Berta.gnoles, being the near-
est neighbor to the north, are the only ones that find it 
convenient to trail sheep over Mr .. Jeremy's property 
rather-than to go a. few miles out of their way and t:Q.us 
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traYerse existing sheep trails. The re.eord shows that the 
existing sheep trails that would avoid the Jeremy prop-
erty haYe been used for livestock purposes a.s differenti-
ated from vehicular travel to avoid a trespass upon 
private and indiYidually o"Tfled property. 
The court in its present decision says in effeet that 
the findings o~ the trial court on questions of fact should 
be sustained 'vithou_t a review of the evidence to support 
the same, if any. The court in effect agrees with our 
enunciation of fundamental principles. The whole de-
cision resolves itself into the use of langua.ge in a most 
generic way, and leaves the reader of the same to 
speculate a.s to why and how the court arrived at its 
decision. 
WHEREFORE, it is respe.ctfully prayed that the court 
ought to re-examine the cause, together with its decision·, 
to the end that this petition for re-hearing be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARLEY W. GusTIN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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